Self-paternalism: The Concept and Key Normative Problems

Abstract

 Paternalism is normally defined as an act where some agent, e.g., the state, imposes something on another agent, e.g., a citizen. That is, one party is acting paternalistically towards another party. In this paper, I argue that self-paternalism is not an oxymoron: one may act paternalistically towards oneself. Self-paternalism typically involves a diachronic aspect, pitting the choice or will of an agent a against the choice or will of a at some later time. I argue that the prior act or decision can be felt as an alien imposition for a at some later time even if it originates from him- or herself. We cannot always say that “the true will” or “the settled preferences” of the agent is identified by the decision to bind oneself an earlier time. Furthermore, doing away with the worry about paternalism by subsuming a's original choice or decision under the harm principle seems to have some very disagreeable moral implications. Furthermore, it is argued that while the “self” in self-paternalism indeed gives us some reason to find such acts morally permissible, this may be outweighed by other, non trivial concerns: Self-paternalist acts may express an undue mistrust in one's own willpower or moral agency. They can be judgmental in a way that conflicts with proper self-respect. Moreover, the restraint or “penalty” attached to certain acts of self-paternalism may be too burdensome. Finally, if an act of self-paternalism contributes to the atrophy of our “moral muscles”, such an act may be morally dubious. I conclude that there is room for both self paternalism as a concept, and for wrong acts of self-paternalism.