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Amongst the multifarious directions and dimensions of abortion, the paper focuses on whether the moral permissibility or impermissibility of aborting the foetus can be grounded on the positive or negative status of its personhood. Paper attempts to put forth philosophical discussion that would enable one to arrive at a secular approach to the question of abortion. The present paper aims to discuss in detail whether the conceptual gap between fetal personhood and the moral impermissibility of abortion can be established through the theories of Hon-Lam Li, Paul S. Penner Richard T. Hull, K.E. Himma, and John F.Crosby. Further, the paper will try to juxtapose all these theories of fetal personhood and attempts to draw out significant lines of comparison and contrast amongst them. This will help in determining which theory comes up with the most cogent synthesis of the ethical and ontological issues in abortion.